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1. Introduction 
 In most developing countries there is a large sector of the economy that is called the 
informal sector or the unorganised sector. Employment in the informal labour market plays 
an important role in most developing economies. Very broadly, the informal labour market 
consists of workers in the informal sector plus casual workers in the formal sector. The 
informal labour market is a very large part of the agricultural sector, but is also a significant 
part of the urban sector. There is a difference between employment in the formal sector and 
the informal sector in terms of the conditions of work, whether workers are subject to 
government taxes, have access to social security or insurance, are casual or contract workers, 
and whether or not they receive minimum wages. 
 The informal economy is a very important sector of the Indian economy. The National 
Council of Applied Economic Research estimates that the informal sector - “unorganised 
sector” - generates about 62% of GDP, 50% of national savings and 40% of national exports 
(ILO 2002, p. 30). In terms of employment, the informal economy provides for about 55% of 
total employment (ILO 2002, p. 14). Urban areas (especially large cities) attract numerous 
migrants from both the rural areas and from smaller urban towns and cities in the hope of a 
better life. 
 The Indian labour market can be conceived of as a segmented market. One segment is 
the formal sector composed of workers who have salaried work, good working conditions, 
and are employed in organised business. The other segment is the informal economy 
consisting of small self-employed traders and business people, and casual workers in the 
informal or formal sectors. Some individuals are born into wealthy families who own large 
businesses and hence are in the formal sector by right of birth. Others who are born with 
parents from the professional classes would almost certainly have education from good 
schools and universities, and have a network of contacts that would ensure their joining the 
ranks of the employed in the formal sector. Some individuals may have built up sufficient 
assets over time to set up small businesses and hence enter the formal sector. However, most 
workers in the formal sector enter the sector through their educational achievements, or by 
birth (children of rich people) and through social networks. For someone who comes from a 
poor background (either in terms of income or belonging to a socially disadvantaged caste or 
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religion) the only way to enter the formal sector is via education in “good” schools3 or 
universities. Even with a good education, entry into the formal sector is often based on family 
connections. The Indian government has for some time had a policy of positive 
discrimination for the Dalits, and as a result they may have a higher probability of finding a 
job in the formal (government) sector. Migrants (especially from rural areas) who come into 
urban areas would likely have to work in the informal sector for some time before they build 
good networks enabling them to move into the formal sector.  
 The literature on the role of the informal sector in developing countries has oscillated 
between treating the informal sector as a backward sector that is holding back economic 
development to a dynamic sector that is helping to develop the economy rapidly without 
straining foreign currency balances and with relatively low demands for (real) capital goods 
(see Mazumdar (1976), Weeks (1975), Bromley (1978), Gerxhani (2004)). The informal 
sector is considered to be a pre-capitalist form of production compared to the formal sector 
which is a profit maximising capitalist sector. There is a large volume of literature on rural-
urban migration (see, Harris and Todaro (1970)) that examines migrants arriving in the city 
and initially finding work in the informal sector, then moving on to better paid work in the 
formal sector. Fields (1975) developed an early model of the informal sector as a “way 
station” along the path toward a formal job in urban areas (De Mel et al. (2010)) which has 
been followed by others.  This view of the informal sector as a temporary abode for migrants 
has been disputed (among others) by Mazumdar (1976). The debate has also ranged over 
whether informal sector workers are living in poor conditions with low incomes, or whether 
some of the informal sector workers are there out of choice and have a comfortable life (see 
Meng (2001)). Some individuals may have employment in the formal sector and work in the 
informal sector as well.  
 Given the setup of the urban labour market in India, some of the important issues to 
investigate are (1) whether individuals working in the informal sector are migrants and 
whether they move out of the informal sector into the formal sector after a few years; (2) 
whether they are from disadvantaged social and ethnic groups who do not have social 
networks to enter the formal sector; and finally (3) whether those with low levels of 
education and skills are unable to enter formal sector employment and have to find low paid 
work in the informal sector. 
                                                          
3 A “good” school would almost certainly be an established private school. 
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 This paper is interested in studying the characteristics of the workers in the informal 
economy and whether migrants treat this sector as a permanent base or only as a temporary 
location before moving on to the organised or formal sector to improve their lifetime income 
and lifestyle. We limit our study to the Indian urban (non-agricultural) sector and study the 
characteristics of the household heads that belong to the informal sector (self-employed and 
informal wage workers) and the formal sector. We find that members who come from the 
lower social groups (castes and religions) are more likely to be in the informal sector. We 
distinguish between migrants in urban location who came from rural areas and those who 
came from other urban areas. We find that the longer duration of a rural migrant in the urban 
area, the lower the probability that the household head would be in the informal sector. 
 In Section 2 below, we clarify the definition of informal labour markets and briefly 
review the literature; Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of the properties of the urban 
informal sector in India; Section 4 discusses the lexicographic preferences that people have 
over formal sector, self-employment, and informal wage labour; Section 5 sets up an 
econometric model for estimating the probability of working in the informal sector and 
provides some results, while Section 6 provides results using a multivariate logit model; 
Section 7 concludes with a summary of the results. In general, we find that the longer the 
duration of a migrant in the urban sector the more likely s/he will have moved out of the 
informal sector. 
 
2. The Informal Labour Market: Definitions and a review of some earlier studies 
 
In the developing country context, the informal sector is sometimes defined in terms 
of the activities of the enterprises (ILO, 1972) and sometimes in terms of the kind of work 
done by individuals as employees or as self-employed people (Hart, 1973). 
In 1972 the ILO characterised the informal sector as: 
(a) Ease of entry 
(b) Reliance on indigenous resources 
(c) Family ownership of enterprise 
(d) Small scale of operation, often defined in terms of hired workers less than (say) ten 
(e) Labour-intensive methods of production and adapted technology 
(f) Skills acquired outside the formal school system 
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(g) Unregulated and competitive markets 
Whereas the formal sector was characterised by: 
(a) Difficult entry 
(b) Frequent reliance on overseas resources 
(c) Corporate ownership 
(d) Large scale of operation 
(e) Capital-intensive and often imported technology 
(f) Formally acquired skills, often expatriate 
(g) Protected markets (through tariffs, quotas, and licences) 
 
Hart (1973) discussed the informal sector in terms of the working conditions of the 
individuals and whether they worked for wages with good conditions or informally as self-
employed workers. Informal activities included: 
 
(a) Farming, market gardening, self employed artisans, shoe makers, tailors, etc. 
(b) Working in construction, housing, road building 
(c) Small scale distribution, e.g. petty traders, street hawkers, caterers in food and drink, 
etc. 
(d) Other services, e.g. barbers, shoe-shiners etc. 
(e) Beggars 
(f) Illegal activities like drug pushing 
 
Formal sector income earning activities included: 
(a) Public sector wage earners 
(b) Private sector wage earners (on permanent contracts, not casual workers) 
 
Sengupta (2009, p. 3) defined the informal economy thus: 
Informal Sector: The unorganised sector consists of all 
unincorporated private enterprises owned by individuals or 
households engaged in the sale and production of goods and services 
operated on a proprietary or partnership basis and with less than ten 
total workers. 
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Informal worker/employment: Unorganised workers consist of those 
working in the unorganised sector or households, excluding regular 
workers with social security benefits provided by employers and the 
workers in the formal sector without any employment and social 
security benefits provided by employers. 
Informal economy: The informal sector and its workers plus the 
informal workers in the formal sector constitute the informal 
economy. 
3. The Indian Informal Labour Market: Some Background Information 
A recent report of the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector by the 
Government of India (Sengupta 2009) found that 86% of the total employment in 2004-2005 
was in the informal sector. Further, the agricultural sector consisted almost entirely of 
informal workers. The non-agricultural workers in the informal sector were 36.5% of the 
total, most of whom were self-employed. From 1999-2000 to 2004-2005 most of the increase 
in employment in the formal sector consisted of informal workers (Sengupta 2009, p.14). The 
NSSO (2012, p ii) document found that in 2009-2010 in the non-agriculture sector, nearly 
71% of the workers in rural areas and 67% in urban areas worked in the informal sector. It 
found that the informal sector activities are concentrated mainly in the manufacturing, 
construction, wholesale and retail trades, and transport, storage and communication 
industries. 
 Our study used data from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2005, 
conducted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, USA. The survey is a nationally representative, multi-topic survey of 41,554 
households in 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighbourhoods across India. The data set has 
detailed information on household employment by industry and occupation, and detailed 
information about household characteristics including age, education, ethnicity, religion, and 
migration status. In this study we have limited our analysis to workers in the informal labour 
markets in the urban sector who are not engaged in any agricultural activities. 
 Our data set consisted of 12,056 heads of households for whom we had data on their 
age, education, marital status, gender, religion, caste, income source, assets, migration status 
and years since migration into the urban sector, and whether they were slum dwelling.  
  
7 
 We define the urban informal sector as artisans, petty traders, small business people 
(who do not hire any labour), and non-agricultural casual workers in the informal or formal 
sectors. The informal sector consists of the self-employed and informal wage labour. We 
define self-employment as petty traders who do not hire any workers and those in the 
organised trade/business category who do not hire any workers. Note that this is a stricter 
definition than that suggested by, for example, Sengupta (2009). The informal wage labour 
category covers those who are in the informal sector but are not self-employed, i.e., the 
artisans, and non-agricultural labourers who are casually employed. The formal sector 
consists of salaried employees, professionals, and organised trade/business people who hire 
workers. In our study we limited our analysis to only the heads of households.  
 
[Figure 1 is about here] 
 
 It is interesting to notice the industry and occupational distribution of the formal and 
informal sectors of the economy in our sample data. Most of the informal wage labour is in 
manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trades, restaurants, and hotels, and in 
community, social and personal services. Self-employment is concentrated (not surprisingly) 
in the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants, and hotels. Informal wage labour is 
concentrated in occupations: production and related workers, transport equipment operators 
and labourers (presumably unskilled workers). 
 
[Figure 2 is about here] 
 
 If we look at the distribution of migrants moving into these sectors, we find that 
38.88% of the migrants work in the formal sector; almost 21.58% are self-employed 
entrepreneurs and 17.30% are informal wage workers.  
 
[Figure 3 is about here] 
 
 A high proportion of migrants (28%) are working primarily in the community, 
personal and social services, 21% in wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, and 
17% in manufacturing. 
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[Figure 4 is about here] 
 
A high proportion of migrants (34%) are employed as production and related workers, 
transport equipment operators and labourers while almost 20% are sales and service workers. 
It is interesting to note that the main income source for migrants (52%) is salaried 
employment; another 18% are in non-agricultural labour. 
[Figure 5 and 6 are about here] 
 
It is interesting to see the caste and religion breakdown for the formal and informal sectors 
(self-employed and informal wage labour). As we would suspect, Brahmins and high caste 
people are more likely to be in the formal sector, compared to the lower social castes and 
Muslims. If we look at the distribution of people by caste and religion for the principal source 
of household income, we see that Brahmins and high caste people are more likely to be 
salaried workers or professionals, whilst Dalits and Muslims are more likely to be non-
agricultural labourers or artisans (see Table 1).  
[Figure 7 is about here] 
 
When we look at the distribution of occupations by caste and religion, we note that Brahmins 
and high caste people are more likely to be in the higher level occupations, while Dalits and 
Muslims are more likely to be in the lower level occupations. When we look at the 
distribution of industries that the different castes and religions are located in, we see that 
manufacturing, transport, and finance are important for most groups. 
4. The Informal Economy: Some Analytical Features 
 We assume that individuals would prefer to work in the formal sector, either as 
employees or as owners/managers. This is based on the idea that the formal sector provides a 
better life not only in terms of present and future income, but also in terms of better working 
conditions (e.g., security of tenure, social security benefits, access to unions, safer working 
conditions). If they are unable to enter the formal sector, we assume that they would prefer to 
be self-employed (as long as their expected incomes are not below that in the informal wage 
sector). Employees in the informal wage sector would prefer to become self-employed if they 
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have access to credit to set up small businesses. Many of them may simply be “waiting” for a 
job in the formal sector. In the Harris-Todaro model, rural migrants come to the urban areas 
as long as their expected wages (urban wage multiplied by the probability of finding a job) 
are greater than their rural subsistence wage. Migrants who do not find work in the urban 
formal sector then enter the urban informal sector which is meant to be a form of “wait 
unemployment”. Essentially, we are arguing that individuals have lexicographic preferences 
over these choices. However, what we observe is a reduced form depending on the household 
head’s choice and success in the formal labour market, and the constraints in the credit 
market that determine whether s/he can become self-employed. Informal wage labour then is 
a residual category. 
 In fact if we look at the actual income (based on our sample), we find that the incomes 
of these three groups overlap to some extent, with the lowest income being in informal wage 
labour, followed by self-employment, followed by formal sector income. Figure 8 presents 
the kernel densities of the logs of informal wage labour, informal self-employment, and 
formal income respectively. As can be seen, informal wage-labour income is distributed to 
the left, informal self-employment income is in the middle, and formal income is to the right 
of the other distributions. There is some overlap at the lower tails of the distributions, but 
self-employment and formal incomes have tails spread out at the higher income levels.  
 
[Figure 8 is about here] 
[Table 3 is about here] 
 
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals that there are significant differences in these kernel 
densities. (All pair-wise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are statistically significant with a p-value 
of 0.000).  Table 3 provides some summary statistics to illustrate the differences in the 
distribution of incomes. As discussed above, the mean (log) income in the formal sector is 
greater than that for the self-employed and that is greater than that for informal wage labour. 
The only curious result seems to be that the minimum of the formal sector is lower than that 
of the other two groups.  
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 To be in the formal sector, domestic capitalists need to have significant amounts of 
capital and access to credit. Inheritance plays a large part in providing either the original 
capital or access to credit. Multinationals come in with large amounts of capital with 
technology that is labour saving (embodied technological change). Employment in the formal 
sector is then limited by the use of imported technology and limited amounts of capital. Note 
that only a limited amount of labour-capital substitution is possible because of embodied 
technology. 
 Wages in the formal sector are fixed by the government (minimum wages), by unions 
or employers using efficiency wage ideas, or by multinational firms that constrain wages. 
Employers in the formal sector ration employment by using education/experience as an index 
of productivity, and using religion/caste as a signal for productivity (statistical 
discrimination). Given two people with the same education/skill levels, they would prefer a 
high caste Hindu to a low caste Hindu or a Muslim. Note: being in the formal economy is not 
a guarantee against poverty (see ILO 2002, p.31). 
 Self-employment (in the informal sector) is constrained by limited amounts of credit 
and access to capital. The higher the social class and the higher the level of education, the 
easier it is to access credit. Note: ILO (2002, p. 31) provides evidence that many in the 
informal economy, especially the self-employed, earn more than unskilled or low-skilled 
workers in the formal economy. 
 Informal sector employment is a residual; the lower the employment in the formal 
sector, the greater the number who look for work in the informal sector, and hence, the lower 
the wages (income) for this sector.  
 Figure 9 below shows that 43% of the self-employed have taken out loans for 
business purposes, compared to only 14% in the formal sector and 16% in the informal wage 
labour group. It is clear that the self-employed have to take out loans for setting up and 
running a small enterprise. Presumably many of the informal wage workers would be 
interested in setting up a small business but are unable to access credit. 
 
[Figure 9 is about here] 
 
To summarise this section, we argue that households have a lexicographic preference 
ordering over the different outcomes, formal, self-employment, or informal wage labour. 
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Migrants, especially rural migrants, have little access to credit or to the formal labour market, 
at least until they have spent some years in the urban sector. 
 
5. Probability of Working in the Informal Sector 
 
 In this section we estimate the probability of a household head working in the 
informal wage employment sector to be self-employed or in the formal sector. As discussed 
earlier, we make three hypotheses. One is that those households that come from the lower 
social classes/groups are more likely to be working in the informal sector. Some of these 
households may have the entrepreneurial skills or have access to small amounts of capital to 
set up as self-employed workers. We also hypothesise that households coming from higher 
social classes/groups, and/or that have higher levels of education are more likely to be 
working in the formal sector.  Further we hypothesise that migrants who come into the urban 
areas would initially find employment in the informal sector and after some time, when they 
have accumulated sufficient funds or developed social networks or skills, are more likely to 
move into the formal sector. In our analysis below we regard migrants as those whose origin 
is in a rural area. Individuals who have come from other urban areas are regarded as "urban 
natives". We hypothesise that the duration of migration from a rural origin influences the 
sector of employment. 
 
5.1 Econometrics and Identification Strategy 
 The fundamental challenge of estimating the causal impact of migration duration on 
the probability of working in the informal sector is the possibility of unobserved individual 
characteristics that might influence the migration decision, survival in a migration 
destination, and the duration as well as the likelihood of working in the informal sector. For 
example, it might be possible that individuals with high unobserved ability or entrepreneurial 
skills might opt to move out of the rural area early in their life and remain in the urban area, 
and such unobserved skills and ability will also influence their choice of sector in the 
migration destination. Without controlling for this, estimation may be biased and 
inconsistent. 
If we had panel data, we could have used methods to control for individual 
heterogeneity. Another ideal method that could be used to disentangle such unobserved 
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influences on migration duration and job status would be by using some natural experimental 
framework or by randomly inducing people to migrate out of rural areas to estimate the 
causal impact of migration on job choice. Lacking the availability of such methods, we need 
to opt for an instrumental variable approach (IV) where we can instrument migration duration 
with a set of variables which do not have a direct influence on job placement or current job 
status.   
One recent method to instrument for migration is using the historic migration rate as 
an instrument for current migration status (for example see, Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), 
Hanson and Woodruff (2003); McKenzie and Rapoport (2007, 2011); López-Córdoba 
(2005); and Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005)). Following the methodology of these 
influential works, we have used the historic state-level migration rates as an instrument for 
current migration duration. In particular, we use the Indian migration rates from data 
collected in the 1991 census at the state level and use this variable as an instrument in which 
the household is currently located.   
It can be argued that these historic migration rates are the result of the massive 
development of railroads and other transportation systems in India coupled with the rapid 
economic expansion of large cities which created extended job demand. These historic 
migration rates can also be considered as signals of migration friendliness, of strong 
migration networks that can effectively lower the cost of migration for future potential 
migrants and increase the chances of their survival. These signals and networks become self-
perpetuating, and as a result, continue to influence the migration decisions of households 
today. 
Our identifying assumption is that historic state-level migration rates do not affect the 
current job placement of the individuals, apart from their influence through current migration. 
Instrumental variables estimation relies on this exogeneity assumption, and so it is important 
to consider and counteract potential threats to its validity.  
One potential threat is that the historic level of inequality and lower economic class 
(lower caste and religious groups) could induce the historic migration rate, and that they are 
also influencing the current rate due to intergenerational transition. To tackle these potential 
pitfalls, we also used interaction terms of historic migration rate with the caste dummies as 
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additional instruments.4 We have also controlled for city- and district-level fixed effects to 
control for spatial differences and location preferences, and report our results based on 
standard errors clustered at the state level to correct for arbitrary correlation in the error 
structure of individuals within a state (McKenzie et al.  2012).  
As our main outcome of interest is whether migrants use the informal sector as their 
temporary base (like a stepping stone), we studied the impact of migration duration of 
individuals on their placement in the informal sector. The reduced form IV approach consists 
of estimating a two-stage model of the following form, where Ij is the outcome variable of 
interest (individual j’s current employment sector), Mjk is individual j’s migration duration, 
and who is currently staying in State k (years of migration since originally migrating), and Zk 
is the set of instrumental variables. Hence the reduced-form first stage equation for migration 
𝑀𝑗𝑘, following Amemiya (1978), would be:  
𝑀𝑗𝑘
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑍𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑗𝑘 +  𝛾𝑘𝑚 + 𝜖𝑗𝑘𝑚,   (1) 
𝑀𝑗𝑘 = �𝑀𝑗𝑘, 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑗𝑘∗ > 𝑀00, 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑗𝑘∗ ≤ 𝑀0 ,                                                               
and the equation for employment in the informal sector 𝐼𝑗𝑘 is  
𝐼𝑖𝑘
∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑗𝑘 +  𝛾𝑘𝑖 + 𝜖𝑗𝑘𝑖 ,                                 (2) 
𝐼𝑗𝑘 = �1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑗𝑘∗ < 𝐼00, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑗𝑘∗ ≥ 𝐼0 .                                                               
Here 𝑀𝑗𝑘∗  is the latent variable for migration decision, and 𝑀𝑗𝑘 is the observed years of 
migration duration to the current state k from the time individual j decided to migrate to state 
k by comparing the costs and benefits using a net benefit function or latent index expressed in 
equation (1).  Similarly, 𝐼𝑖𝑘∗  is the latent job placement and 𝐼𝑗𝑘 is the dummy of job placement 
in the formal and informal sectors for the same individual j living in state k which can be seen 
arising by comparing the job qualifications and job related network information (such as 
informal or formal referral system) required for the job placement expressed in equation (2). 
In this setup the first dependent variable, 𝑀𝑗𝑘 , appears in the second equation as an 
endogenous variable. Here, Xjk includes the following set of controls: personal and household 
characteristics, family background information, family composition information, religion, and 
                                                          
4  As a robustness check, we ran regressions without land holding variables, and our regression 
remained consistent. 
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a dummy variable indicating whether or not the person is an urban native (the dummy is 
equal to one if the individual i who currently resides in state k is born in an urban area and 
zero if the person is a rural-to-urban migrant). Personal characteristics include age, age2, sex, 
education and marital information, whereas household characteristics include wealth status of 
the household which has been constructed using the principal component analysis of the 
household non-durable assets.5 Family background information contains variables on father’s 
education and occupation history.  𝛾𝑘𝑀  and  𝛾𝑘𝐼  are unmeasured determinants of 𝑀𝑖𝑘  (e.g., 
migrant's own community network) and  𝐼𝑖𝑘  which is fixed at the state level (e.g., state's 
specialization in a particular occupational sector). 𝑀0 and 𝐼0 are unknown thresholds. 
Finally,  𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑀  and 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝐼  are non-systematic errors which follow 𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑀|𝑋𝑖𝑘,𝑍𝑘, 𝛾𝑘𝑀) = 0  and (𝜖𝑖𝑘𝐼 �𝑋𝑖𝑘, 𝛾𝑘𝐼) = 0. 
Given the setup of binary outcomes with a continuous endogenous variable, we use 
maximum-likelihood to estimate a multivariate probit model, which we will refer to by 
following the common practice of mentioning it as a IV-Probit model.6  
 
5.2 Estimation 
 
As discussed above. we estimated a limited-information maximum-likelihood model for the 
probability of an individual being in the informal sector as a function of the duration of 
migration (for rural-to-urban migrants), demographic characteristics, household 
characteristics, religion and family background information, shown in Table 4. In addition we 
included district- and city-level fixed effects to capture unobserved geographical and regional 
impacts on an individual's job placement in the informal sector. Clustered standard errors at 
the state level are employed for all regressions to derive statistical inference. For robustness 
check of our estimations, we used full sample (column 1) as well as different sub-samples, 
such as males between 15 and 65 years of age (column 3) and males only (column 5). In all 
regressions, using different sub-samples, our results are largely consistent and none of the 
                                                          
5 This variable ranks the value of non-durable assets from 1 to 6 Rank 1, the lowest, is households 
with a total value of non-durables of less than 500 rupees. Rank 6, the highest, is households with 
asset valued at more than 20,000 rupees. (On 12th March 2013 the exchange rate was: 100 INR=1.84 
USD. 
6 Estimations were carried out by using the IVProbit command with MLE option in STATA version 
11.2 
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variables changed sign. We have also reported the marginal effects of all estimations in the 
respective sub-sample estimations in columns 2, 4 and 6 respectively. To show consistency in 
our estimation, we have also estimated a simple probit model without treating the duration of 
migration as endogenous, shown in column 7. The probit result shows a small and negative 
but statistically weak significance of migration duration on probability of someone being in 
the informal sector. Once we instrument for migration duration in columns 1 to 6, however, 
this effect becomes larger and statistically more significant.             
 
[Table 4 is about here] 
 
We would expect the higher the education of an individual, the lower the probability 
of belonging to the informal sector. The evidence, see Table 4, shows clearly that the higher 
the level of education of the household head the lower the probability of being in the informal 
sector, and the coefficients get smaller (bigger in absolute value) respectively. The results for 
father’s education are very similar to the household head’s education level. Further, we 
would expect that if the father of the individual was of a higher social class (in terms of 
occupation), the probability of being in the informal sector would be lower. Again the 
evidence supports the view that the parent’s occupation clearly influences an individual’s 
employment placement: if the father’s occupation is formal in nature like executive or clerk, 
the probability of being in the informal sector is lower, while if the father’s occupation is 
sales (which is mostly informal in nature in the Indian context), then there is a higher 
probability of being in the informal sector. As discussed earlier, we would expect a person 
from a socially disadvantaged caste or religion more likely to be in the informal sector. Our 
findings show that OBC (Other Backward Classes) and Muslims are more likely to be in the 
informal sector. We did not find any statistically significance for Dalits (the lower social 
castes) in the informal sector compared with Brahmins, which may be attributable to the 
government’s positive discrimination in employment in the government sector (reservation 
system) for Dalits. As we would expect, the wealthier the household head, the less likely s/he 
would be in the informal sector. Our results suggest that urban natives are more likely to be in 
the formal sector as they have more access to better schools, social networks and job 
information and referrals compared with the rural-to-urban migrants. Our main variable of 
interest is rural migration duration. In all cases it is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
In other words, the longer a rural migrant has been in an urban area the more likely that 
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individual would have moved to the formal sector. (Note the rural migration duration variable 
has been instrumented).  
The validity of IV estimations depends on the power of instruments in explaining the 
predicted values at the first stage. As reported, all the first stage regressions have very high F-
statistics (for example, for our preferred specification of column 1, the first stage F-statistic is 
31.77). We have also tested for the joint significance of our IVs, and the results 
overwhelmingly reject the null of no joint significance. The Wald statistic of the exogeneity 
test has rejected the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. We have also tested the instruments 
using the typical 2SLS models to test for the over-identification test (Anderson canonical 
correlations test) and under-identification test (Sargan-Hansen test) which have duly 
supported our instruments.   
 
6.0 Multinomial Estimation (Formal, Self-Employed, and Informal Wage)  
 
In this section we have separated the informal sector into those who are self-employed and 
those who work in the informal or formal sectors as wage labourers to check whether or not 
highly qualified individuals are employed in the formal sector and also to check if migrants 
use the informal sector as their temporary base. We did this check by employing a 
multinomial logit job attainment model following the work of Xin Meng (2001). 
6.1 Econometric modelling 
 Standard neo-classical economic rationality for an individual’s job placement (labour 
supply) is a function of individual endowments and human resources (e.g., level of education 
and experience). However, other related factors that could also have an impact on an 
individual’s labour supply, especially in the context of India, could be the family size (Brown 
at el. 1980), family background, caste and religious affiliation (see for example Banerjee and 
Knight (1985) or Ito (2009)). Another less frequently studied factor that might be critical is 
the job related network, for example, job-opening information, formal and informal channels 
of job search and referral (see for example Holzer 1987 or  Calvó-Armengol, A., & Zenou, Y. 
(2005)).  Since urban natives usually have a better endowment of job-related networks and 
referrals, we could hypothesise that migrants will acquire access to such networks as their 
migration duration increases and hence are less likely to be in informal wage labour.  
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A multinomial logit model is specified below to capture how these variables will 
influence an individual j’s probability of working in sector s. Formally the model is: 
𝑃𝑗𝑠 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑦𝑗 = 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠� = 𝑒𝑥𝑗′ 𝛽𝑠
� 𝑒𝑥𝑗
′𝛽𝑙
𝑆
𝑠=1
  𝑗 = 1, … … ,𝑁; 𝑠 = 1, … … , 𝑆.       (3)   
where N is the size of the sample, S is the number of sectors and xj is a vector of variables 
affecting the labour placement outcome yj. The dependent variable yj for equation (3) is the 
nature of an individual’s current job in any of the three sectors: formal sector, self-
employment or informal wage labour sector. Our main variable of interest, years of migration 
duration, is endogenous in nature. Hence to allow for the endogeneity in estimating equation 
(3), we first used the fitted value of migration duration using all the instruments (estimation 
done through OLS). In the second step we used the fitted value of the migration duration in 
equation 3. The standard errors of the estimates in the second step have been estimated 
through a bootstrapping process with 100 replications. 
6.2 Estimations 
The results of marginal effects of endogenous multinomial probit estimations are 
reported in Table 5 with full sample and in Table 6 with male only sub-sample. The 
dependent variable has been categorized into three groups with formal sector employment 
being used as a base category.   
Tables 5 and 6 are broadly similar to those reported in section 5 of the IV-probit 
model (Table 4). For both the self-employed and informal wage labour sectors, education, 
father’s characteristics, and the caste and religion coefficients have essentially the same signs 
and significance. The main point of difference is that a rural migrant’s duration of migration 
does not significantly influence the probability of being in the self-employed sector, but is 
negative and significant for the informal wage labour sector. In other words, we find that the 
longer a rural migrant has been in the urban sector the less likely he would be in informal 
wage employment. For instance, an individual with one additional year’s of migration 
duration from the rural area reduces his/her probability to be in informal wage employment 
by 2.52%. However, this variable has no statistically discernible effect on him/her being in 
the self-employed or formal sectors. Results on education are consistent with the other 
findings that with more years of education, individuals will less likely be in the informal 
sector. In the case of self-employment, education up to the tertiary level does not have any 
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statistically significant impact; however, for tertiary level education and higher, the 
probability of someone being self-employed is significantly reduced. 
 
[Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
 
The validity of multinomial regression lies on the strong assumption of the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which means that adding or deleting 
alternative outcome categories does not affect the odds among the remaining outcomes. To 
check whether this assumption holds in our case, we have performed the test for the IIA 
assumption, and we find no evidence violating the assumption (using the full-sample 
specification of Table 5). 
 
7. Conclusions 
 In our paper we have defined migrants as those individuals who have migrated from 
rural to urban areas. Those who were born in urban areas and migrated to another urban area 
are not considered as migrants.7 Also note that in our multinomial logit regressions, for the 
sake of simplicity of estimation, we used only the rural-to-urban migration duration as 
endogenous and properly took care of such endogenous regression by using instruments to 
predict the fitted value of the variable and plugged in the fitted value in the final multinomial 
regression. One could argue, however, that urban-to-urban migration could also be 
endogenous. We have also used urban-to-urban migration as endogenous in separate 
regression estimations in the multinomial logit framework (not reported) and in a linear 
probability model, and in both cases the variable was insignificant and did not appear to be 
influential in explaining the likelihood of person’s placement in the informal labour market.   
In this paper we have argued that there are segmented labour markets in India’s urban 
sector: people who are from the lower social classes (castes or religions) are more likely to 
work in the informal sector. We found that getting more education is one way of getting a job 
in the formal sector, but perhaps more important are family networks in providing an entry 
into the formal labour market. We argued that when rural migrants move to the urban sector, 
they initially find themselves working in the informal sector where they have lower incomes 
and work in industries like construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trades, 
                                                          
7 Those who were born in other countries are not part of the sample in our estimations. 
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restaurants and hotels, transport, and social and personal services. Their occupations are 
mainly in the lower social grades, such as production and related work, transport, sales and 
service work, and working as labourers. We noted that caste and religion is important. The 
principal source of income for Dalits and Muslims is non-agricultural labour or as artisans. 
Brahmins and high caste people are more likely to be in higher level occupations.   
We argued that there is a hierarchy of preferences, that people would prefer to work in 
the formal sector, with the self-employed sector being the second choice, and lastly working 
in the informal wage labour market. However, entry into the formal sector is constrained by 
education, social class, and family ties. Self-employment is constrained by access to the 
credit market.  
We estimated a model of the probability of working in the informal sector as a 
function of demographic characteristics, education, father’s education and occupation, caste 
and religion, and duration of a migrant in his/her present occupation. We distinguished 
between migrants who had come from rural areas from those who had moved from other 
urban areas. We treated the duration of the migrant as an endogenous variable and estimated 
a two-stage least-squares model. We found that most of the explanatory variables were 
significant and of the expected signs. In particular, we found that education and father’s 
education and occupational status were important. Muslims and Other Backward Classes 
were more likely to be working in the informal sector. 
The most interesting finding of our research is that the longer a rural migrant has been 
working in the urban sector, the more likely s/he will have moved out of the informal wage 
sector. The results support the view that for migrants, the informal wage labour market may 
be a stepping stone to a better life in the formal sector.  
However, using a cross-sectional data set to analyse migration and urban employment 
is a challenging task. Migrants have a higher attrition probability due to the mobility of the 
population. Hence, when a researcher is confronted with a migrant population, it is difficult 
to define the population at hand, as there are constant inflows and outflows of individuals 
with different traits. Moreover, duration raises the possibility of right censoring which could 
not be addressed with the data at hand. These results need to be researched further using 
panel data, which unfortunately are not available as yet. 
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Appendix:  
Figure 1: Distribution of Employment across Industries 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Households across Occupations 
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Figure 3: Employment Category Based on Migration Status 
 
Figure 4: Migrants by Industry 
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Figure 5: Migrants by Occupation 
 
Figure 6: Migrants and Income Source 
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Figure 7: Caste and Religion by Sector 
 
Figure 8: Kernel Densities of Log Income by Employment 
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Figure 9: Purpose of Loan by Sector 
 
 
Table 1: Caste and Religion by Source of Income 
 Non-Ag labour Artisan 
Petty 
traders Business Salaried Professionals Total 
Brahmin 56 67 68 136 705 43 1,075 
High Caste 254 182 277 536 1,429 59 2,737 
OBC 875 437 341 446 1,438 56 3,593 
Dalit 664 205 105 108 803 18 1,903 
Adivasi 97 11 16 35 238 6 403 
Muslim 598 295 211 256 471 29 1,860 
Sikh, Jain 9 20 32 61 129 5 256 
Christian 54 19 4 20 126 6 229 
Total 2,607 1,236 1,054 1,598 5,339 222 12,056 
Source: India Human Development Survey 
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Table 2: Caste and Religion by Occupation 
 Brahmin High caste OBC Dalit Adivasi Muslim 
Sikh, 
Jain Christian Total 
Professions, 
Technical and 
Related 
Workers 
195 280 245 105 49 72 27 22 995 
Administrative, 
Executive and 
Managerial 
Workers 
135 357 427 147 28 243 35 27 1,399 
Clerical and 
Related 
Workers 
188 329 361 191 50 84 23 24 1,250 
Sale Workers 190 746 765 235 52 445 97 21 2,551 
Service Workers 71 172 210 248 44 87 11 18 861 
Production, 
Transport and 
Labourers 
159 551 1,236 799 141 732 41 67 3,726 
Missing 137 302 349 178 39 197 22 50 1,274 
Total 1,075 2,737 3,593 1,903 403 1,860 256 229 12,056 
Source: India Human Development Survey 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Log Incomes by Sector 
Variable: Log of Income Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Formal 6916 11.2313 0.81603 6.21461 15.6904 
Self-Employment 1324 10.7466 0.76783 6.8024 13.7695 
Informal Wage Labour 3744 10.4617 0.70924 6.44883 13.731 
Source: India Human Development Survey 
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Table 4: IV-Probit Estimates of the Probability for Informal Sector Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Varible: Full Sample 
Male, Aged between  
15 to 65 Male only 
Full Sample 
Probit 
Informal Sector Employment Coefficient M.E. Coefficient M.E. Coefficient M.E. Coefficient 
Urban Native -0.535*** -0.195*** -0.551*** -0.202*** -0.541*** -0.199*** -0.152*** 
 
(0.10) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) 
Rural to urban migration duration -0.076*** -0.029*** -0.079*** -0.031*** -0.076*** -0.029*** -0.004* 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age -0.009 -0.003 -0.023 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 -0.037*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age Square 0.0000 0.0000 0.000** 0.000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.000*** 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Male 0.423*** 0.153***   
 
  
 
0.518*** 
 
(0.09) (0.03)   
 
  
 
(0.09) 
No. of Households 0.026*** 0.010*** 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.027*** 0.010*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Married 0.065 0.025 0.044 0.017 0.038 0.015 0.015 
 
(0.10) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.13) 
Primary Education -0.128* -0.049* -0.079 -0.03 -0.072 -0.028 -0.172** 
 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) 
Secondary Education -0.300*** -0.113*** -0.274*** -0.104*** -0.260*** -0.099*** -0.364*** 
 
(0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) 
Matric Completed -0.539*** -0.194*** -0.530*** -0.193*** -0.523*** -0.191*** -0.652*** 
 
(0.10) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06) 
Tertiary Education -0.693*** -0.240*** -0.682*** -0.239*** -0.678*** -0.237*** -0.865*** 
 
(0.13) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.09) 
Graduate -0.928*** -0.327*** -0.946*** -0.334*** -0.921*** -0.328*** -1.150*** 
 
(0.15) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.08) 
High caste 0.112*** 0.044** 0.062 0.024 0.105** 0.041** 0.119** 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
OBC 0.140*** 0.055*** 0.132** 0.051** 0.149*** 0.058*** 0.220*** 
 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) 
Dalit 0.041 0.016 -0.013 -0.005 0.018 0.007 0.061 
 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) 
Adivasi -0.207** -0.078** -0.244*** -0.091*** -0.209** -0.079** -0.263*** 
 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) 
Muslim 0.166** 0.065** 0.158** 0.062** 0.186** 0.073** 0.318*** 
 
(0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) 
Sikh, Jain 0.078 0.031 -0.032 -0.012 0.049 0.019 0.183* 
 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) 
Christian -0.003 -0.001 0.041 0.016 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.13) (.) (0.15) (0.06) (0.15) (0.06) (0.12) 
Father's Occupation: Professional -0.103 -0.039 -0.084 -0.032 -0.076 -0.029 -0.209*** 
 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) 
Father's Occupation: Executive -0.367*** -0.133*** -0.344*** -0.126*** -0.356*** -0.130*** -0.468*** 
 
(0.10) (0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) 
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Father's Occupation: Clerk -0.335*** -0.123*** -0.367*** -0.135*** -0.336*** -0.124*** -0.494*** 
 
(0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.08) 
Father's Occupation: Sales 0.130*** 0.051*** 0.145*** 0.057*** 0.146*** 0.057*** 0.171*** 
 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Father's Occupation: Service -0.285*** -0.106*** -0.286*** -0.107*** -0.266*** -0.100*** -0.343*** 
 
(0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) 
Father's Occupation: Agro 0.036 0.014 0.018 0.007 0.042 0.016 -0.241*** 
 
(0.11) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) 
Father's Education: Primary -0.117*** -0.045*** -0.120*** -0.046*** -0.119*** -0.046*** -0.131*** 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Father's Education: Secondary -0.170*** -0.065*** -0.172*** -0.066*** -0.168*** -0.065*** -0.185*** 
 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 
Father's Education: Tertiary -0.257*** -0.096*** -0.293*** -0.109*** -0.259*** -0.097*** -0.330*** 
 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.07) 
Father's Education: Graduation -0.311*** -0.115*** -0.314*** -0.116*** -0.319*** -0.118*** -0.334*** 
 
(0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) 
Asset Status (1 to 6) -0.120*** -0.046*** -0.132*** -0.051*** -0.123*** -0.048*** -0.148*** 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
City Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
District Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Observations 10,521   9,685   9,668   10,521 
Log pseudolikelihood -42761 
 
-38409 
 
-39067 
 
-5754 
chi2 29420 
 
672226 
 
57984 
 
  
Wald test of exogeneity  6.579*** 
 
5.506*** 
 
6.38*** 
 
  
F-Statistics at First Stage 31.77***   29.38***   30.00 
 
  
H0: Coefficient of IVs are zero 66.88***   58.92***   49.44***     
Source: Indian Human Development Survey 2005: Authors own Calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the state level. Significance code: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. M.E. stands for 
Marginal Effects which have been calculated at the mean. In all these specifications, we consider as migrants only those who have migrated from rural 
to urban areas for jobs. Those who were born in an urban setup and migrated to another urban area for jobs are not considered as migrants. The best 
specification is column (1). Estimations used in columns 1-6 are based on Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE). The instruments used in the first stage 
of the regressions are historic state-level migration rates and the interaction of the variable with caste dummies. 
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Table 5: Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Regression (full sample)  
 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Formal Self-employment Informal Wage Labour 
Urban Native 0.0466*** -0.00768 -0.0389*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rural to urban migration duration 0.0169 0.00723 -0.0241** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.00770** -0.00319 -0.00451 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Square -8.11e-05*** 3.34E-05 4.77e-05* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male -0.171*** 0.0614*** 0.110*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
No. of Households -0.0152*** 0.0018 0.0134*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.00122 -0.0383 0.037 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
Primary Education 0.0319 0.0308* -0.0627*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Secondary Education 0.0935*** 0.0252* -0.119*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Matric Completed 0.179*** 0.00299 -0.182*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tertiary Education 0.218*** -0.0103 -0.208*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Graduate 0.339*** -0.0396*** -0.300*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
High caste -0.0474* 0.0238 0.0235 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
OBC -0.0743*** 0.0322** 0.0421* 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Dalit -0.0177 -0.0372*** 0.0549** 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Adivasi 0.0571* -0.0288 -0.0283 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Muslim -0.115*** 0.0415* 0.0737*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Sikh, Jain -0.0473 0.0457 0.00166 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Christian 0.0358 -0.0655 0.0297 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) 
Father's Occupation: Professional 0.0505** 0.00458 -0.0551*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Father's Occupation: Executive 0.144*** -0.0153 -0.129*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
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Father's Occupation: Clerk 0.144*** -0.0331*** -0.111*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Father's Occupation: Sales -0.0764*** 0.148*** -0.0716*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Father's Occupation: Service 0.106*** -0.0123 -0.0940*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Father's Occupation: Agro 0.0346 -0.0228 -0.0119 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Father's Education: Primary 0.0450*** -0.00915 -0.0358*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Father's Education: Secondary 0.0706*** -0.0122 -0.0584*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Father's Education: Tertiary 0.121*** -0.0234 -0.0973*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Father's Education: Graduation 0.137*** -0.0203 -0.117*** 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Asset Status (1 to 6) 0.0615*** -0.00687** -0.0547*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
District Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,521 10,521 10,521 
Source: Indian Human Development Survey 2005: Authors Own Calculation. 
Note: The base outcome is formal employment. The variable "Rural to urban migration duration" is considered endogenous; 
hence the fitted value of migration duration has been estimated by OLS using all variables and instruments at the first stage. The 
instruments used are historic state-level migration rates and the interaction of the variable with caste dummies. Standard errors 
are in parentheses which have been computed using a bootstrapped method with 100 repetitions. Significance code:  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Regression (male only sample)  
 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Formal Self-employment Informal Wage Labour 
Urban Native 0.0502*** -0.00966 -0.0405*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rural to urban migration duration 0.0156 0.00831 -0.0239** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.00781 -0.004 -0.00381 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Square -7.71e-05** 0.0000397 0.0000375 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
No. of Households -0.0166*** 0.00176 0.0149*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.00762 -0.0359 0.0283 
 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Primary Education 0.0057 0.0434* -0.0491*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Secondary Education 0.0813*** 0.0286 -0.110*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Matric Completed 0.175*** 0.00523 -0.180*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Tertiary Education 0.215*** -0.00755 -0.207*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Graduate 0.339*** -0.0363** -0.302*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
High caste -0.0412* 0.0239 0.0173 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
OBC -0.0727*** 0.0332** 0.0395** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Dalit -0.00579 -0.0402*** 0.0460** 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Adivasi 0.0588* -0.0238 -0.035 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Muslim -0.122*** 0.0437** 0.0783*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Sikh, Jain -0.0336 0.0502 -0.0166 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Christian 0.0382 -0.0689 0.0307 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) 
Father's Occupation: Professional 0.0392 0.00944 -0.0486** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Father's Occupation: Executive 0.138*** -0.0172 -0.121*** 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Father's Occupation: Clerk 0.144*** -0.0251* -0.119*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
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Father's Occupation: Sales -0.0816*** 0.158*** -0.0760*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Father's Occupation: Service 0.100*** -0.0051 -0.0951*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Father's Occupation: Agro 0.0377 -0.0239 -0.0138 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Father's Education: Primary 0.0455*** -0.0101 -0.0354*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Father's Education: Secondary 0.0700*** -0.0131 -0.0570*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Father's Education: Tertiary 0.123*** -0.025 -0.0983*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Father's Education: Graduation 0.141*** -0.0205 -0.121*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Asset Status (1 to 6) 0.0632*** -0.00656** -0.0567*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
District Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9668 9668 9668 
Source: Indian Human Development Survey 2005: Authors Own Calculation. 
Note: The base outcome is formal employment. The variable "Rural to urban migration duration" is considered endogenous; hence the 
fitted value of migration duration has been estimated by OLS using all variables and instruments at the first stage. The instruments used 
are historic state-level migration rate and the interaction of the variable with caste dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses which 
have been computed using a bootstrapped method with 100 repetitions. Significance code:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Summary Statistics 
 Formal Informal Total 
Male 0.902 0.935 0.916 
 (0.297) (0.246) (0.277) 
Rural to urban migration 0.283 0.246 0.267 
 (0.45) (0.431) (0.443) 
Rural to urban migration duration 4.337 3.595 4.023 
 (9.077) (8.355) (8.787) 
Income (in Rupees) 103171.280 49812.840 80625.834 
 (124176.363) (51689.736) (103573.581) 
Age 45.968 43.181 44.791 
 (11.936) (12.299) (12.169) 
Size of the Household 4.842 5.066 4.937 
 (2.089) (2.089) (2.092) 
Married 0.984 0.983 0.984 
 (0.124) (0.128) (0.126) 
Primary Education 0.053 0.148 0.093 
 (0.223) (0.355) (0.290) 
Secondary Education 0.168 0.301 0.224 
 (0.374) (0.459) (0.417) 
Matriculation Complete 0.177 0.170 0.174 
 (0.382) (0.376) (0.379) 
Tertiary Education 0.163 0.099 0.136 
 (0.370) (0.299) (0.343) 
Graduate 0.399 0.123 0.283 
 (0.490) (0.328) (0.450) 
Adivasi 0.041 0.024 0.033 
 (0.197) (0.152) (0.180) 
Dalit 0.143 0.178 0.158 
 (0.350) (0.382) (0.365) 
Muslim 0.108 0.218 0.154 
 (0.310) (0.413) (0.361) 
Father's Occupation: Professional 0.111 0.056 0.089 
 (0.314) (0.230) (0.285) 
Father's Occupation: Executive 0.030 0.010 0.022 
 (0.169) (0.098) (0.145) 
Father's Occupation: Clerk 0.108 0.036 0.079 
 (0.311) (0.186) (0.270) 
Father's Occupation: Sales 0.132 0.189 0.155 
 (0.338) (0.392) (0.362) 
Father's Occupation: Service 0.113 0.085 0.102 
 (0.316) (0.279) (0.302) 
Father's Occupation: Agro 0.352 0.341 0.347 
 (0.478) (0.474) (0.476) 
Father's Occupation: Labourer 0.155 0.284 0.207 
 (0.362) (0.451) (0.405) 
Father's Education: Primary 0.222 0.226 0.224 
 (0.416) (0.418) (0.417) 
Father's Education: Secondary 0.236 0.140 0.196 
 (0.425) (0.347) (0.397) 
Father's Education: Tertiary 0.050 0.014 0.035 
 (0.218) (0.119) (0.184) 
Father's Education: Graduation 0.063 0.013 0.042 
 (0.243) (0.115) (0.201) 
N 6962 5094 12056 
 
